


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

CYPRUS: WHAT NEXT?

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23

7 December 1967
No. 1678/67

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 December 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Cyprus: What Next?

Summary

Successful efforts for peace on Cyprus have averted a military confrontation for the time being, but details of implementation of the agreement and difficulties over basic issues could create new tensions. Although some new working rules on the overall Cyprus problem may evolve, the road to a permanent solution will be long and hard. In any event, Cypriot President Makarios is likely to be the central figure in the island's future and his tactics will probably be designed to reduce the influence of both Athens and Ankara in the island's affairs.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services.

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1. The immediate dangers of an armed clash over Cyprus seem to have dissipated. Presidential envoy Vance's mediating efforts undoubtedly contributed to avoiding a military clash between Ankara and Athens who, left to themselves, might have let the passions of the moment carry them into a violent confrontation.

2. Even with the threat of war lessened, several of the problems inherent in the tenuous agreement for peace could upset the precarious balance among the parties in the dispute. These elements and the more basic problems in the Cyprus dispute will continue to plague relations between Greece and Turkey, and to be a potential source of friction within NATO and the Western alliance.

Problems for the UN

3. The most immediate focal point for new tensions will probably be the forthcoming debate in the UN Security Council over the proposal to enlarge the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Although Secretary General Thant has some flexibility in dealing with the original UNFICYP mandate of 4 March 1964, he apparently believes any broadened role for peacekeeping on the island must receive the approval of the council as a whole. The debate on the new mandate will probably be highlighted by Makarios' insistence on guarantees against military intervention, by his claims that pacification is indeed an objective of the Cyprus Government, and by his stipulation that any new measure must not infringe on Cyprus' sovereignty. Ankara will push the terms on the new Greek-Turkish agreement, which calls for expanded pacification measures to ensure the protection and well-being of the Turkish Cypriot community.

4. Some action will have to be taken by 26 December, when the current UNFICYP mandate expires. The USSR has consistently refused to contribute to UNFICYP's financing and abstained from the vote on the original mandate. In the present circumstances it is likely to follow the same course. France and other council members may also look carefully at any extension of the mandate.

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5. Not only will Makarios protest any UNFICYP moves which seem to restrict his freedom of action, but he may also attempt to use the UNFICYP himself to open up areas which are now under the domination of the Turkish Cypriot community. Both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots have tried to keep these enclaves isolated from Greek Cypriot contact.

Difficulties for Greece

6. The withdrawal presents Greece with new problems, even though Athens, under Foreign Minister Pipinelis' prodding, accepted Turkey's demand for the removal of "illegal" troops from the island and claims, for home consumption, that it intended to do this even before the crisis. The first priority will be to carry out the withdrawal as expeditiously as Ankara expects, but there will probably be disputes over the manner in which the troops are evacuated. Ankara suspects Athens may try to conceal the actual number of troops now on the island as well as to leave some behind. Whatever the Greek intent, Athens has already indicated that UN supervision would violate the "good faith" agreement between the two parties.

7. There are other, more far-reaching, consequences of the Greek troop withdrawal, however, which will be damaging to the Greek position on the overall Cyprus problem. The presence on the island of a sizable number of Greek troops was a significant factor in maintaining Greek mainland control and influence over Cypriot political and military affairs. Mainland troops not only served in separate Greek units, but officers and probably key noncommissioned ranks had been infiltrated into the Cyprus National Guard, both in command and training capacities. This effectively suspended Cypriot control of what was supposed to be Makarios' own defense force. With the mainland Greeks gone, Makarios will then have full control over all aspects of the island's military affairs, except for the London-Zurich Treaty contingent of 950 Greek troops still under the command of a Greek officer.

8. Another question is the future activity of the island's sizable Communist element in the absence of an effective Greek mainland force. Athens has long worried about the way Makarios handles the Communists and particularly his readiness to accept the Communists' qualified support for his aims for self-determination. The Greek military regime has shown special interest in strengthening anti-Communist measures on the island.

The Question of Cyprus-Greece Union

9. The basic aim of all Hellenism--enosis (union) of Cyprus with Greece--may have suffered its most damaging blow to date. The prospects for enosis, uncertain even before the present melee, would seem to be just about nil under the present circumstances. Although Makarios publicly claimed that enosis with Greece was his ultimate objective, his consistent efforts to sabotage Greek and Turkish efforts to bring about a negotiated solution based on some form of enosis or partition point toward what is probably his real objective--independence. Cypriot protests during the present crisis that both Greece and Turkey must refrain from meddling in the island's affairs point in the same direction. Makarios most certainly has enjoyed his seven years as the president of an independent republic and presumably would give up this role only at the point of a sword or possibly if he could unite Cyprus with Greece on his own terms. Ankara itself will probably have little interest in further discussions of any permanent solution with a Greek Government which does not have the muscle or the skill to bring the wily Makarios to heel.

Turkey's Problems in Withdrawal

10. Turkey, although insistent that its treaty contingent of 650 men stay on the island, has agreed to withdraw its illegal troops. This, too, may be potentially serious in the long run, although Ankara itself may try some deceptive tactics in the withdrawal. For the past four years, Turkish mainland control of the Turkish Cypriot community has been increasingly exercised through the infiltration of

mainland military personnel. Ankara may attempt to continue to supply this leadership through the periodic rotation of its legal contingent. This system, however, has its limitations and the discipline in the Turkish community may deteriorate. Undercurrents of dissatisfaction over Ankara's failure to go all the way militarily may increase and could bring a breakdown of morale in the community or new provocations calculated to bring intervention from the mainland. While there is a possibility that Makarios could agree to accept limited Turkish Cypriot participation in the affairs of government--and this might well be agreeable to some members of a demoralized Turkish Cypriot community--it would not satisfy diehard elements both on the island and in Ankara.

Outlook

11. Whatever the form and substance of the future problems over the island, Cypriot President Makarios will almost certainly occupy center stage. His basic tactics will probably be calculated to preserve the island's independence and to lessen the influence of both Ankara and Athens in the island's affairs. This argues that more confrontations are likely.

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
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